News (341)
The project to modernize the Loano Airport in Haut-Katanga’s Lubumbashi officially began on April 18, 2025. Summa Group, a Turkish firm, is running the long-awaited project. Selim Bora, Summa Chairman and CEO, presented the project to President Félix Tshisekedi, who laid the symbolic foundation stone.
“The Congolese government has signed a contract with a specialist firm for this work,” the presidency announced, though details of the contract and the selection process remain undisclosed. In July 2022, Summa had signed two contracts with the state for infrastructure projects, though those did not move forward.
According to Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister Jean-Pierre Bemba, the modernization project includes building a new terminal, runway widening, tarmac development, and upgraded navigational aids.
Other well-informed sources added that the terminal will handle up to one million passengers, with a tarmac sized for four wide-body aircraft. The plan also includes a cargo terminal (capacity 5,000 tonnes), maintenance center, storage hangar, wastewater treatment plant, upgraded fire safety systems, and modernized access roads.
Local media report a 20-month timeline, with construction employing about 1,200 workers. The same sources stressed that upon completion, around 600 permanent jobs are expected.
This project is part of a broader strategy to modernize major airports nationwide, including Kinshasa’s N’Djili Airport. Lubumbashi, the DRC’s second-largest city, is a vital hub for mining and trade. Past upgrades in 2015 added a control tower and technical block at Loano.
Provincial authorities hope the new airport will establish Haut-Katanga as a key business, tourism, and transit center.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
On April 19, 2025, the Congolese government announced a series of decisive measures against former president Joseph Kabila Kabange: suspending his political party (PPRD), seizing his assets, and launching legal proceedings.
The Ministry of Justice accused Kabila of direct involvement in the aggression against the DRC by the Alliance du fleuve Congo (AFC)/M23 rebels, who are backed by Rwanda.
These actions follow reports—and confirmation by Interior Minister Jacquemain Shabani Lukoo—of Kabila’s arrival in Goma from Rwanda. Lukoo described it as “a deliberate choice to return to the country via a town under enemy control, which curiously guarantees his security.”
Back in February, at the Munich Security Conference, President Félix Tshisekedi had already accused Kabila of being “the real sponsor” of the eastern rebellion. His presence in Goma now appears to authorities as further evidence of this claim.
A Complicated Matter
The announced seizure of Joseph Kabila’s assets—and those of “his alleged accomplices”—raises a thorny issue: how to clearly identify which assets to freeze? At the core lies the question of beneficial ownership—uncovering the real beneficiaries behind complex asset structures.
For years, Kabila’s supposed fortune has been under scrutiny. A 2016 Bloomberg investigation revealed a network of over 70 companies tied to his family, spanning sectors in the DRC and abroad, including the US, Panama, Tanzania, and the Pacific tax haven Niue.
In 2021, the Congo Hold-up probe, led by international journalists and NGOs, exposed alleged embezzlement of $138 million through a local bank benefiting the Kabila clan. Documents suggest some Chinese owners of major copper and cobalt mines funneled money to Kabila relatives via this bank.
Back in 2017, the Congo Study Group reported that the Kabila family controlled about 80 companies, 71,000 hectares of farmland, and multiple mining licenses.
Kabila’s circle has consistently denied these claims, calling them “delatory maneuvers” and “unjustified assaults,” particularly after the Congo Hold-up revelations.
Tracking Beneficial Ownership: Progress and Challenges in the DRC
Beneficial ownership identifies the true individuals who control companies beyond formal nominee structures.
Groups like the Tax Justice Network push for public beneficial ownership registers, backed by organizations such as the FACTI Panel and the Economic Commission for Africa.
The DRC has made strides with Law n°22/068 of December 27, 2022, mandating the identification of beneficial owners. Yet, according to the 2022 EITI report, significant hurdles remain. The ministerial decree to establish a national register is still pending. Of 91 extractive firms reporting, only 47 disclosed beneficial ownership—and often incompletely.
The Action Group against Money Laundering (GABAC), in its latest reinforced monitoring report, flags a lack of clear mechanisms ensuring authorities’ access to this data. It highlights “significant shortcomings” in identifying legal entities, underscoring that much work lies ahead.
Big Stakes
The issue of beneficial ownership extends far beyond the Kabila case, touching on deeper systemic governance issues. In a resource-rich region plagued by misappropriation concerns, transparency about true asset owners is crucial for development.
Rising tensions between Félix Tshisekedi and Joseph Kabila give this debate a strong political edge. However, in the long run, only robust legal tools and reliable registers will address illicit enrichment, corruption, and hidden financing effectively.
This article was initially published in French by Georges Auréole Bamba
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
This year, Alphamin Resources anticipates an output of 17,500 tons at its Bisie tin mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The figure is down 14.2% compared to the previous forecast of 20,000 tons. The firm issued the revised target in a statement dated April 17.
In the official statement, Alphamin attributed its decision to a “security-related interruption.”
Operations were temporarily halted on March 13 due to the advancing M23 rebel group and their Rwandan allies, raising safety concerns for employees and subcontractors. Production subsequently plummeted by 18.4% in Q1 2025 compared to Q4 2024, dropping from 5,237 to 4,270 tonnes.
Despite the rebels’ proximity, Alphamin resumed processing stockpiled ore on April 15. Mining activities are set to gradually restart this month, with staff and logistics providers—including those handling equipment and tin transport—returning to the site.
However, reaching the revised production goal depends heavily on the security situation. Peace talks between the Congolese government and M23 rebels began in Doha under Qatar’s mediation, but no major progress has yet been reported.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Corn prices dropped sharply in the first quarter of 2025 across southeastern DRC, especially in Grand Kasaï, Grand Katanga, and Maniema. In some areas, prices have fallen by half or more.
“Corn usually spikes during the lean season from September to December. We hope to replicate that success, thanks mainly to eased import rules and a boost in local production,” said National Economy Minister Daniel Mukoko Samba on April 14, 2025.
Back in August 2024, the government had rolled out 24 measures to bolster corn supply across the country. The measures targeted corn and corn flour importers, with a focus on cutting or abolishing duties, taxes, and fees.
Some charges were eliminated, while others were reduced by up to 50%, easing corn’s entry into the market and helping lower prices.
Dynamics in Greater Katanga
In Greater Katanga, the price of a 25kg maize bag has dropped from CF100,000 to CF46,000 (ed note: CF stands for Congolese Francs), thanks to revived local production and import support measures.
During a visit to Haut-Katanga on April 16, Minister Mukoko Samba met with some importers to address supply chain challenges. Following the meeting, Africa Bull Logistics Sarl pledged to deploy 100 trucks—each carrying 1,600 bags—to transport 500,000 bags monthly. Additionally, two 800 m² warehouses were secured to ease storage issues.
Dynamics in Greater Kasai
Similar trends are seen in Greater Kasaï provinces. In Mbuji-Mayi (Kasaï Oriental), a 3kg maize measure dropped from CF6,000 to CF3,000, driven by a surge in local production fueled by the Nkwadi agricultural park, backed by provincial and central governments.
In Kananga (Kasaï Central), prices fell from CF7,000 to CF2,500, thanks to the World Bank-supported National Agricultural Development Program (PNDA) boosting the Demba and Mweka zones.
Tshikapa (Kasaï) saw an even steeper decline, with the maize measurette plunging from CF4,500 to just CF1,500.
Increased Supply Eases Prices in Maniema
In Kindu (Maniema), maize supply benefits from train shipments from Kongolo (Tanganyika) via the Société nationale des chemins de fer du Congo (SNCC). This has pushed the price of a 3kg measurette down from CF5,000 to CF2,500.
Despite these gains, the DRC remains heavily reliant on imports. According to August 2024 data from the Minister of the Economy, national maize production stands at about 3 million tonnes annually, far below the 13 million tonnes needed, creating a persistent 10 million tonne shortfall each year.
Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
On April 16, 2025, Orange Group laid the foundation stone for its future headquarters in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The firm thus officially kicked off the project, which it expects to be done by October 2027.
The eight-story building will cover 10,000 m² and feature an autonomous solar energy system. Located on Avenue des Huileries in Lingwala commune, opposite the Martyrs de la Pentecôte stadium, the headquarters symbolizes Orange’s deep local commitment.
“This project reflects our digital ambition and local roots,” said Orange DRC CEO Ben Cheick Haidara, highlighting confidence in the country’s economic and digital potential despite a challenging business environment.
Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Digital Affairs Augustin Kibassa Maliba called the headquarters “a major leap forward for the DRC’s technological development,” envisioning a modern, innovative workspace that will benefit all Congolese.
According to the Congolese telecom watchdog, ARPTC, Orange is the nation's second-largest mobile operator, with 18.5 million subscribers. It trails Vodacom's 22.5 million but is ahead of Airtel and Africell.
Global Market Share in Q2 (left) and Q3 (right) of 2024 (Source : Arptc)
With 62.2 million mobile subscribers—reaching a penetration rate of 65.8%—and 32.1 million mobile internet users (33.8% penetration), the DRC’s population of over 100 million marks a market still ripe with untapped potential.
The government’s strong push to make digital transformation a key driver of economic and social growth aligns perfectly with the opportunities Orange sees in the DRC.
The company is well-positioned to lead across multiple sectors, including the booming startup scene, digitalization of public and private services, cloud computing, data storage, and cybersecurity.
Mobile Money Market Share in Q2 (left) and Q3 (right) of 2024 (Soure: ARPTC)
Another key growth driver of Orange in the DRC is Mobile Money, with its penetration rate of 26.7%.
But realizing these ambitions depends heavily on the continuation of government reforms to boost the digital economy. Critical areas include enhancing the regulatory framework, managing frequency spectrum, expanding infrastructure, issuing new licenses, and improving access to mobile devices.
Political and security stability in the country are key to ensuring these investments’ materialization over the long term.
Muriel Edjo, We Are Tech
Washington will continue supporting the Lobito Corridor, a rail and road project linking the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mineral-rich regions to Angola’s Atlantic port. Massad Boulos, U.S. Senior Advisor, said so in a press briefing on April 17, 2025, after visiting the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya.
“We are aware that we fully support the Lomito Corridor, for example, and this is a huge project which is extremely important and vital for the economies of not only Congo or the DRC, but also Zambia and Angola, but all other regional countries will benefit from it,” Boulos stated, noting that the U.S. Development Finance Corporation is a major financier, with funding expected soon.
The American official also detailed ongoing discussions with DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s administration to develop infrastructure on the Congolese side. “We are now discussing with the Congolese Chesikides administration to work on the Congolese side with regards to railways, highways, but also power projects, including dams and hydroelectric projects,” he said. These talks aim to address the DRC’s infrastructure deficits, critical for mining operations and economic growth in a country with over 60% of global cobalt reserves.
The announcement comes as the Trump administration, which took office in January 2025, has reduced budgets for international development aid, raising questions about continued U.S. funding for projects like the Lobito Corridor. No specific funding commitments were detailed in the briefing, leaving uncertainty about the scale of U.S. financial involvement.
The U.S. commitment coincides with its growing role in mediating the conflict in eastern DRC, where the M23 rebel group, allegedly backed by Rwanda, is in a clash with Congolese forces. In this regard, Boulos highlighted progress in recent DRC-M23 talks in Qatar and U.S. efforts to negotiate a peace agreement, alongside discussions for a minerals deal to boost American private sector investment. The deal aims to secure U.S. access to DRC’s critical minerals, though specifics remain under negotiation.
For now, China dominates Infrastructure development projects in the DRC, often through minerals-for-infrastructure agreements. The World Bank, African Development Bank, France’s AFD, and Belgium’s Enabel are the main competitors offsetting Chinese dominance. “With regards to other companies and other players and other countries that are existing and already operating there, it’s none of our business to interfere with what they’re doing. We’re pursuing our own ventures, and we’re facilitating investments of our own companies. And time will tell. I think very soon the Congolese people will realize who their best partners are,” Boulos declared.
The Lobito Corridor is central to the DRC’s economic strategy, particularly for eastern regions like Katanga and North Kivu, where conflict disrupts mineral supply chains. The project aims to streamline cobalt, copper, and tin exports, reducing reliance on southern African routes and boosting trade efficiency. By addressing economic drivers of conflict, improved infrastructure could stabilize mining operations, create jobs, and support peace efforts for the DRC.
Written by Georges Auréoles Bamba
Edited by Ola Schad Akinocho
At its April 11 Council of Ministers meeting, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) adopted a draft decree granting petroleum rights directly to the state-owned Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures du Congo (Sonahydroc). The decree outlines the legal and fiscal framework for this transfer, in line with the 1 August 2015 oil and gas law.
This move is part of the DRC’s renewed strategy to revive exploration and ramp up oil production, aiming to better harness its resource potential. The plan includes “immediately” awarding Sonahydroc petroleum rights for blocks 1 and 2 in the Albertine Graben through service contracts.
Service contracts offer more attractive tax terms than production sharing agreements and avoid signing bonuses, making them a favored tool to attract foreign investors. Once awarded, Sonahydroc will develop these blocks in partnership with local and international companies.
Since July 2022, the DRC has sought partners to exploit 27 oil blocks. After canceling a tender in October 2024, the oil and gas Minister announced a relaunch for early 2025, prioritizing “restricted tenders for strategic blocks.”
However, this direct allocation to Sonahydroc marks a shift toward greater state control, echoing Prime Minister Judith Suminwa’s call for tighter organization of block distribution and a stronger role for the government in the oil sector.
Estimates of DRC’s reserves vary wildly: the presidency cites 22 billion barrels across 27 blocks; other sources suggest around 5 billion barrels; while the CIA World Factbook lists proven reserves at just 180 million barrels.
This article was initially published in French by Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Due to the war in the Eastern region, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is missing out on 4.5% of its budget. Finance Minister Doudou Fwamba revealed this on April 9, 2025 during a press conference. The 2025 Finance Act projects revenues of 51,553.6 billion Congolese francs (CF), but this shortfall could reach 2,319.9 billion CF—nearly one billion dollars.
Since January, rebel groups M23/AFC have seized key eastern towns including Goma, Bukavu, Masisi, Minova, and Walikale. Their occupation disrupts public administration and slows regional economic activity.
“Strategies are being developed to close this gap,” Fwamba assured, though he offered no specifics. Meeting the government’s goal to boost internal revenues 30% over 2024 looks doubtful. Customs and excise revenues—expected at 7,769.1 billion CF—are especially hit by blocked trade routes and port shutdowns.
The 2025 Finance Law flags persistent eastern insecurity as a “major risk to public finances”, threatening budget balance, policy funding, and economic stability.
Budget pressures deepen with rising military costs. An unplanned salary doubling for soldiers and police since March forced government cuts, though details remain undisclosed.
This article was initially published in French by Boaz Kabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
On April 14, 2025, Katamba Mining, 70% owned by China’s Zijin Mining, launched a tender to hire a subcontractor to build and operate a crushing plant. The facility will produce gravel and sand for the Mpiana-Mwanga III hydroelectric project, located over 90 km northeast of Manono in Tanganyika province. Interested companies have until April 22 to submit bids.
The hired company will set up temporary infrastructure, build a production system, mobilize equipment and personnel, site logistics, transport materials, ensure waste disposal, produce technical reports, and carry out maintenance works.
This project follows the recent rehabilitation of the first two phases of the nearly century-old plant, idle since 1998. Katamba Mining invested $80 million to restore the facility and boost its capacity by 30%, raising it to 40 MW as announced in December 2024. However, during a March 2025 site visit, MP John Banza Lunda noted that only the first unit is operational, delivering 4 MW.
Details remain sparse, but last January, Katamba’s second-largest shareholder, Congolaise d’Exploitation Minière (Cominière), estimated the new plant’s capacity at around 150 MW, with the entire complex eventually nearing 200 MW.
Powering Manono Mine
According to the recently launched tender, work on the crushing plant is scheduled from May 1, 2025, to January 31, 2027. “Recommissioning Mpiana-Mwanga as a renewable energy source secures power for Manono mine, local processing plants, and communities,” said Zijin Mining VP James Wang at the end of the rehabilitation works.
The power upgrade supports Manono, home to one of the world’s largest high-grade lithium deposits. Zijin aims to start production in Q1 2026.
Rehabilitation of Mpiana-Mwanga was part of a feasibility study by AVZ Minerals, Cominière’s former partner until 2022. The joint venture, controlled by the Australian company, was close to securing a mining permit when disputes escalated. AVZ is now contesting the matter before the International Court of Arbitration.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko and Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
As of April 16, 2025, Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) has yet to resume diamond mining. The state-owned giant has been absent from production reports since mid-2024, putting at risk the ambitious targets announced last November by MIBA Chairman Jean-Charles Okoto.
“We want to produce one million carats per month in 2025,” Okoto told Belgian daily L’Écho, aiming for 12 million carats annually. This target is bold, given that the DRC produced 8.34 million carats last year, down from 10.78 million in 2022.
Okoto, appointed in November 2023, traveled to Europe in late 2024 seeking “new partners” to revive MIBA, which has struggled for over two decades. ASA Resource, which holds a 20% stake in the state-owned firm, pledged $50 million for the revival.
Meanwhile, the DRC government, which owns 80%, approved a $70 million minimum recovery plan in August 2024. Last December, President Félix Tshisekedi announced that $50 million would be allocated for MIBA’s restart.
Yet, funds remain elusive. A report from the Kasaï Oriental governor’s office on April 8 reveals that the $50 million promised by the President has not yet been released. It’s also unclear if ASA Resource has fulfilled its contribution. The status of the recovery plan’s implementation remains undisclosed.
The $70 million plan, more modest than Okoto’s goals, targets 2.5 million carats by 2026. It calls for urgent debt restructuring, reducing liabilities, and convening an extraordinary shareholders' meeting.
MIBA’s Managing Director, André Kabanda Kana, has identified four South African companies—Bond Equipment, Mining Services, Athur Mining, and Consulmet—interested in supplying modern equipment to restart operations. These firms toured mining sites and should soon submit bids.
Rehabilitating the Lubilanji hydroelectric plant is also critical to resume production. Czech firm Seko, contracted a year ago for the project, announced on March 24 that work would start “shortly.”
Though a restart is still far off, local expectations run high. The Kasaï Oriental governorate calls MIBA’s revival “the wish of more than one Kasaïen.” Officials estimate that renewed operations could create up to 2,500 jobs.
Looking ahead, MIBA plans to diversify into gold, nickel, and chromium mining and expand into other provinces of the Greater Kasai region.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko and Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
More...
The Council of Trade Ministers for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) convenes its 16th meeting today, April 15, in Kinshasa. This summit comes at a critical moment for African economic integration as global trade turbulence intensifies.
World trade is under strain, amid an escalating US-China trade war, sparked by President Donald Trump’s recent move to slap 145% tariffs on Chinese imports. Beijing swiftly retaliated, imposing 125% tariffs on American goods. The tit-for-tat is disrupting supply chains and rattling financial markets, with US-China trade volume already dropping.
China, having anticipated possible decoupling from the US for years, now faces immediate pain. According to French media Le Monde, Chinese exporters are already feeling the squeeze; major ports like Shanghai report shrinking shipments to the US. Even with Trump’s temporary exemptions for some electronics, the situation remains volatile. As growth in China slows to around 5% in 2025, the country is being forced to rethink its export and trade strategies.
Africa Caught in the Crossfire
The conflict between the US and China threatens Africa’s economic stability, since the two behemoths are the continent’s two biggest trading partners.
China has been Africa’s top trading partner for more than a decade. Now, with Beijing under mounting pressure from Washington and Brussels, Africa faces new threats: falling demand from China for African raw materials, disruptions to the supply chains that keep its factories running, and greater volatility in commodity prices—all of which hit export revenues hard.
There’s also the growing danger of Africa becoming an “economic proxy battlefield” for global powers, especially over critical minerals.
China’s move to cut back on US soybean imports shows just how quickly commodity markets can shift. If the trade conflict heats up, African exports could face similar jolts, threatening the continent’s already fragile economic balance.
AfCFTA: Africa’s Strategic Shield
In these uncertain times, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is more than just a trade pact—it’s a strategic shield for the continent. Speeding up its implementation is crucial.
First, the AfCFTA can break Africa’s dependence on outside players. Intra-African trade is just 15% today. Raising this number would help cushion the continent from global shocks and supply chain chaos.
Second, deeper integration makes Africa far more attractive to global investors. With 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP above $3 trillion, the AfCFTA gives investors access to a vibrant, continent-wide market. When companies know that investing in one African country opens the door to the entire continent, Africa becomes a much stronger proposition compared to other emerging markets.
Finally, the AfCFTA would bolster Africa’s voice in the economic and diplomatic spheres, enabling African countries to demand fairer deals from giants like China, the EU, and the US. Alone, they get pushed around. United, they hold real negotiating power.
AfDB’s Unit of Account: A Tool for African Financial Independence
Beyond trade, monetary reform is key to Africa’s resilience. In this regard, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has proposed a new African Unit of Account (AUA), a bold step toward financial autonomy.
Modeled on the gold standard, the AUA would be backed by Africa’s rich reserves of critical minerals—cobalt, lithium, manganese—which make up 30% of the world’s supply and have surged over 600% in value from 2004 to 2024.
This unit could cut Africa’s reliance on the US dollar, shielding economies from exchange rate swings. It could also lower infrastructure financing costs by 30 to 40%, stabilize intra-African trade, and transform natural resources into financial leverage instead of just exporting them.
With 70% of African debt tied to foreign currencies like the dollar and euro, the AUA could protect the continent from currency shocks, especially as global trade tensions escalate.
Time to Act
Africa can’t afford to wait. The US-China trade war isn’t a passing storm—it signals a deep shift in the global economic order. In this new reality, fast-tracking the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is critical.
Three priorities stand out: enabling the free movement of people, harmonizing trade standards, and investing heavily in transport corridors and digital infrastructure to connect Africa’s economic hubs.
The AfCFTA isn’t just another trade deal—it’s Africa’s economic project of the century, a blueprint for a new economic civilization. As global power dynamics shift, Africa must stop playing on the sidelines and emerge as an independent, influential force.
This article was initially published in French by Idriss Linge (Ecofin Agency)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, Governor of South Kivu, revealed that at least 1,600 companies are illegally mining resources in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He made this statement before the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee on April 2, 2025, during a hearing on the region's security and economic situation.
Upon taking office in June 2024, Sadiki initiated a mining sector overhaul. A month later, he issued an order suspending mining activities to identify companies operating illegally. "We expected 400 companies, but 1,600 showed up—some having operated for 8 to 10 years without permits, taxes, or registration," he said.
These companies, mostly Chinese-owned, are part of a broader network illicitly exploiting gold, coltan, cassiterite, copper, and diamonds. Sadiki and UN experts believe this network benefits Rwanda, which acts as a gateway for multinationals due to its superior infrastructure and supply chain. This allows them to bypass the DRC's disorganized market to access its minerals through the neighboring country.
Economic War
Governor Sadiki alleged that 750,000 kg of gold are smuggled out every six months for refining in Rwanda, "which has set up refineries right on the border." The EU sanctioned Rwanda's Gasabo Gold Refinery on March 17, 2025, for processing illegally mined gold from the DRC, though Kigali denies involvement without providing mineral origin proof.
The official added that most of this illicit gold is exported to the Middle East—67% goes to Dubai, UAE, and Saudi Arabia—while less than 2% reaches Europe. The rest heads to China.
Purusi Sadiki argues that the conflict in eastern DRC is economically driven, with Rwanda seeking land control, commercial dominance, and mineral monopolization. He notes that “M23 rebels, backed by Rwanda, align their progress with mining site locations.”
Rwanda countered, stating it only took defensive actions to “protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity” against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which it sees as an “existential threat” following their refuge in the DRC since the 1994 genocide.
Internal Struggles
To address ongoing tensions, Governor Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki advocates for a "mining for peace, security, and development" deal. This would involve integrating more European and American companies into the DRC's mineral exploitation, hoping their presence could deter armed groups and stabilize the region.
President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi and Sadiki both believe that Western interests can help restore order. Currently, Kinshasa is negotiating a mineral agreement with Washington.
However, the governor's early tenure in South Kivu highlights the DRC's internal challenges. Corruption and an overly complex tax system—featuring over 1,400 taxes, including 147 deemed unnecessary—pose significant obstacles. Despite these hurdles, Sadiki claims to have boosted the province's mining revenues from $500,000 to $1.75 million after just one month of reforms.
This article was initially published in French by Georges Auréole Bamba
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Congolese Prime Minister Judith Suminwa recently met with DP World executives in Dubai(UAE). They discussed the Banana deepwater port project, which DP World is developing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
According to the Emirati executives, the first phase of the project, originally due in 2025, could be finished in 2026. Suminwa noted that DP World has promised to get the first ships landing "as early as next year, 2026," provided everything goes smoothly.
The Prime Minister reaffirmed her government's commitment to seeing the project through. "We're showing that the DRC and the President of the Republic, through the government, are truly dedicated to completing this project," she said.
Launched in 2022, the project faced setbacks in 2024, “due to financial and technical issues.” However, after a breakthrough in September, work resumed in October.
Last March, DP World awarded Mota-Engil a $250 million contract to complete the first phase of the project–building a 600-meter quay, developing a 30 ha storage area, and setting up modern container facilities with an annual processing capacity of 450,000 containers.
Strategically located in the Kongo-Central province, the port will give the DRC direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, bypassing neighboring countries' ports.
This article was initially published in French by Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
China Molybdenum Company (CMOC) produced 30,414 tonnes of cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Q1 2025. Year-on-year, the Chinese group’s output grew 20%, according to a report, dated April 8, relayed by Reuters.
Despite the Congolese government’s recent suspension of cobalt exports, CMOC has maintained its production levels and forecasts for 2025, expecting between 100,000 and 120,000 tonnes of cobalt. CMOC did not justify its decision.
However, the move reflects the strategic nature of cobalt as a by-product of copper mining at CMOC’s Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. Interrupting cobalt production would affect copper output, which remains profitable due to relatively stable prices. In Q1 2025, CMOC’s copper production increased by 15.7%.
Launched in February, the suspension is in place for four months, which means CMOC could resume exports later in the year. Since the ban, cobalt prices on the London Metal Exchange have risen from around $21,000 to $33,000 per tonne, a 57% increase, supporting the government's strategy to boost prices and earn more from the cobalt mining.
" This level, the highest since May 2023, validates the approach adopted by the government and makes it possible to envisage, in the short term, a significant recovery in contributions to state revenues from the exploitation of this resource," the Congolese government stated at the end of the Council of Ministers meeting on April 4.
However, there are no guarantees that CMOC will fully benefit from this price upturn, as the ban could be extended. Moreover, when exports resume, a potential influx of cobalt could pressure prices downward. In response, the DRC is considering export quotas to maintain market equilibrium, though specific details have not been disclosed.
This article was initially published in French by Emiliano Tossou (Ecofin Agency)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho