On April 14, 2025, Katamba Mining, 70% owned by China’s Zijin Mining, launched a tender to hire a subcontractor to build and operate a crushing plant. The facility will produce gravel and sand for the Mpiana-Mwanga III hydroelectric project, located over 90 km northeast of Manono in Tanganyika province. Interested companies have until April 22 to submit bids.
The hired company will set up temporary infrastructure, build a production system, mobilize equipment and personnel, site logistics, transport materials, ensure waste disposal, produce technical reports, and carry out maintenance works.
This project follows the recent rehabilitation of the first two phases of the nearly century-old plant, idle since 1998. Katamba Mining invested $80 million to restore the facility and boost its capacity by 30%, raising it to 40 MW as announced in December 2024. However, during a March 2025 site visit, MP John Banza Lunda noted that only the first unit is operational, delivering 4 MW.
Details remain sparse, but last January, Katamba’s second-largest shareholder, Congolaise d’Exploitation Minière (Cominière), estimated the new plant’s capacity at around 150 MW, with the entire complex eventually nearing 200 MW.
Powering Manono Mine
According to the recently launched tender, work on the crushing plant is scheduled from May 1, 2025, to January 31, 2027. “Recommissioning Mpiana-Mwanga as a renewable energy source secures power for Manono mine, local processing plants, and communities,” said Zijin Mining VP James Wang at the end of the rehabilitation works.
The power upgrade supports Manono, home to one of the world’s largest high-grade lithium deposits. Zijin aims to start production in Q1 2026.
Rehabilitation of Mpiana-Mwanga was part of a feasibility study by AVZ Minerals, Cominière’s former partner until 2022. The joint venture, controlled by the Australian company, was close to securing a mining permit when disputes escalated. AVZ is now contesting the matter before the International Court of Arbitration.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko and Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
As of April 16, 2025, Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) has yet to resume diamond mining. The state-owned giant has been absent from production reports since mid-2024, putting at risk the ambitious targets announced last November by MIBA Chairman Jean-Charles Okoto.
“We want to produce one million carats per month in 2025,” Okoto told Belgian daily L’Écho, aiming for 12 million carats annually. This target is bold, given that the DRC produced 8.34 million carats last year, down from 10.78 million in 2022.
Okoto, appointed in November 2023, traveled to Europe in late 2024 seeking “new partners” to revive MIBA, which has struggled for over two decades. ASA Resource, which holds a 20% stake in the state-owned firm, pledged $50 million for the revival.
Meanwhile, the DRC government, which owns 80%, approved a $70 million minimum recovery plan in August 2024. Last December, President Félix Tshisekedi announced that $50 million would be allocated for MIBA’s restart.
Yet, funds remain elusive. A report from the Kasaï Oriental governor’s office on April 8 reveals that the $50 million promised by the President has not yet been released. It’s also unclear if ASA Resource has fulfilled its contribution. The status of the recovery plan’s implementation remains undisclosed.
The $70 million plan, more modest than Okoto’s goals, targets 2.5 million carats by 2026. It calls for urgent debt restructuring, reducing liabilities, and convening an extraordinary shareholders' meeting.
MIBA’s Managing Director, André Kabanda Kana, has identified four South African companies—Bond Equipment, Mining Services, Athur Mining, and Consulmet—interested in supplying modern equipment to restart operations. These firms toured mining sites and should soon submit bids.
Rehabilitating the Lubilanji hydroelectric plant is also critical to resume production. Czech firm Seko, contracted a year ago for the project, announced on March 24 that work would start “shortly.”
Though a restart is still far off, local expectations run high. The Kasaï Oriental governorate calls MIBA’s revival “the wish of more than one Kasaïen.” Officials estimate that renewed operations could create up to 2,500 jobs.
Looking ahead, MIBA plans to diversify into gold, nickel, and chromium mining and expand into other provinces of the Greater Kasai region.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko and Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
The Council of Trade Ministers for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) convenes its 16th meeting today, April 15, in Kinshasa. This summit comes at a critical moment for African economic integration as global trade turbulence intensifies.
World trade is under strain, amid an escalating US-China trade war, sparked by President Donald Trump’s recent move to slap 145% tariffs on Chinese imports. Beijing swiftly retaliated, imposing 125% tariffs on American goods. The tit-for-tat is disrupting supply chains and rattling financial markets, with US-China trade volume already dropping.
China, having anticipated possible decoupling from the US for years, now faces immediate pain. According to French media Le Monde, Chinese exporters are already feeling the squeeze; major ports like Shanghai report shrinking shipments to the US. Even with Trump’s temporary exemptions for some electronics, the situation remains volatile. As growth in China slows to around 5% in 2025, the country is being forced to rethink its export and trade strategies.
Africa Caught in the Crossfire
The conflict between the US and China threatens Africa’s economic stability, since the two behemoths are the continent’s two biggest trading partners.
China has been Africa’s top trading partner for more than a decade. Now, with Beijing under mounting pressure from Washington and Brussels, Africa faces new threats: falling demand from China for African raw materials, disruptions to the supply chains that keep its factories running, and greater volatility in commodity prices—all of which hit export revenues hard.
There’s also the growing danger of Africa becoming an “economic proxy battlefield” for global powers, especially over critical minerals.
China’s move to cut back on US soybean imports shows just how quickly commodity markets can shift. If the trade conflict heats up, African exports could face similar jolts, threatening the continent’s already fragile economic balance.
AfCFTA: Africa’s Strategic Shield
In these uncertain times, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is more than just a trade pact—it’s a strategic shield for the continent. Speeding up its implementation is crucial.
First, the AfCFTA can break Africa’s dependence on outside players. Intra-African trade is just 15% today. Raising this number would help cushion the continent from global shocks and supply chain chaos.
Second, deeper integration makes Africa far more attractive to global investors. With 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP above $3 trillion, the AfCFTA gives investors access to a vibrant, continent-wide market. When companies know that investing in one African country opens the door to the entire continent, Africa becomes a much stronger proposition compared to other emerging markets.
Finally, the AfCFTA would bolster Africa’s voice in the economic and diplomatic spheres, enabling African countries to demand fairer deals from giants like China, the EU, and the US. Alone, they get pushed around. United, they hold real negotiating power.
AfDB’s Unit of Account: A Tool for African Financial Independence
Beyond trade, monetary reform is key to Africa’s resilience. In this regard, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has proposed a new African Unit of Account (AUA), a bold step toward financial autonomy.
Modeled on the gold standard, the AUA would be backed by Africa’s rich reserves of critical minerals—cobalt, lithium, manganese—which make up 30% of the world’s supply and have surged over 600% in value from 2004 to 2024.
This unit could cut Africa’s reliance on the US dollar, shielding economies from exchange rate swings. It could also lower infrastructure financing costs by 30 to 40%, stabilize intra-African trade, and transform natural resources into financial leverage instead of just exporting them.
With 70% of African debt tied to foreign currencies like the dollar and euro, the AUA could protect the continent from currency shocks, especially as global trade tensions escalate.
Time to Act
Africa can’t afford to wait. The US-China trade war isn’t a passing storm—it signals a deep shift in the global economic order. In this new reality, fast-tracking the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is critical.
Three priorities stand out: enabling the free movement of people, harmonizing trade standards, and investing heavily in transport corridors and digital infrastructure to connect Africa’s economic hubs.
The AfCFTA isn’t just another trade deal—it’s Africa’s economic project of the century, a blueprint for a new economic civilization. As global power dynamics shift, Africa must stop playing on the sidelines and emerge as an independent, influential force.
This article was initially published in French by Idriss Linge (Ecofin Agency)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, Governor of South Kivu, revealed that at least 1,600 companies are illegally mining resources in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He made this statement before the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee on April 2, 2025, during a hearing on the region's security and economic situation.
Upon taking office in June 2024, Sadiki initiated a mining sector overhaul. A month later, he issued an order suspending mining activities to identify companies operating illegally. "We expected 400 companies, but 1,600 showed up—some having operated for 8 to 10 years without permits, taxes, or registration," he said.
These companies, mostly Chinese-owned, are part of a broader network illicitly exploiting gold, coltan, cassiterite, copper, and diamonds. Sadiki and UN experts believe this network benefits Rwanda, which acts as a gateway for multinationals due to its superior infrastructure and supply chain. This allows them to bypass the DRC's disorganized market to access its minerals through the neighboring country.
Economic War
Governor Sadiki alleged that 750,000 kg of gold are smuggled out every six months for refining in Rwanda, "which has set up refineries right on the border." The EU sanctioned Rwanda's Gasabo Gold Refinery on March 17, 2025, for processing illegally mined gold from the DRC, though Kigali denies involvement without providing mineral origin proof.
The official added that most of this illicit gold is exported to the Middle East—67% goes to Dubai, UAE, and Saudi Arabia—while less than 2% reaches Europe. The rest heads to China.
Purusi Sadiki argues that the conflict in eastern DRC is economically driven, with Rwanda seeking land control, commercial dominance, and mineral monopolization. He notes that “M23 rebels, backed by Rwanda, align their progress with mining site locations.”
Rwanda countered, stating it only took defensive actions to “protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity” against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which it sees as an “existential threat” following their refuge in the DRC since the 1994 genocide.
Internal Struggles
To address ongoing tensions, Governor Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki advocates for a "mining for peace, security, and development" deal. This would involve integrating more European and American companies into the DRC's mineral exploitation, hoping their presence could deter armed groups and stabilize the region.
President Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi and Sadiki both believe that Western interests can help restore order. Currently, Kinshasa is negotiating a mineral agreement with Washington.
However, the governor's early tenure in South Kivu highlights the DRC's internal challenges. Corruption and an overly complex tax system—featuring over 1,400 taxes, including 147 deemed unnecessary—pose significant obstacles. Despite these hurdles, Sadiki claims to have boosted the province's mining revenues from $500,000 to $1.75 million after just one month of reforms.
This article was initially published in French by Georges Auréole Bamba
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Congolese Prime Minister Judith Suminwa recently met with DP World executives in Dubai(UAE). They discussed the Banana deepwater port project, which DP World is developing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
According to the Emirati executives, the first phase of the project, originally due in 2025, could be finished in 2026. Suminwa noted that DP World has promised to get the first ships landing "as early as next year, 2026," provided everything goes smoothly.
The Prime Minister reaffirmed her government's commitment to seeing the project through. "We're showing that the DRC and the President of the Republic, through the government, are truly dedicated to completing this project," she said.
Launched in 2022, the project faced setbacks in 2024, “due to financial and technical issues.” However, after a breakthrough in September, work resumed in October.
Last March, DP World awarded Mota-Engil a $250 million contract to complete the first phase of the project–building a 600-meter quay, developing a 30 ha storage area, and setting up modern container facilities with an annual processing capacity of 450,000 containers.
Strategically located in the Kongo-Central province, the port will give the DRC direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, bypassing neighboring countries' ports.
This article was initially published in French by Ronsard Luabeya (intern)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
China Molybdenum Company (CMOC) produced 30,414 tonnes of cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Q1 2025. Year-on-year, the Chinese group’s output grew 20%, according to a report, dated April 8, relayed by Reuters.
Despite the Congolese government’s recent suspension of cobalt exports, CMOC has maintained its production levels and forecasts for 2025, expecting between 100,000 and 120,000 tonnes of cobalt. CMOC did not justify its decision.
However, the move reflects the strategic nature of cobalt as a by-product of copper mining at CMOC’s Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines. Interrupting cobalt production would affect copper output, which remains profitable due to relatively stable prices. In Q1 2025, CMOC’s copper production increased by 15.7%.
Launched in February, the suspension is in place for four months, which means CMOC could resume exports later in the year. Since the ban, cobalt prices on the London Metal Exchange have risen from around $21,000 to $33,000 per tonne, a 57% increase, supporting the government's strategy to boost prices and earn more from the cobalt mining.
" This level, the highest since May 2023, validates the approach adopted by the government and makes it possible to envisage, in the short term, a significant recovery in contributions to state revenues from the exploitation of this resource," the Congolese government stated at the end of the Council of Ministers meeting on April 4.
However, there are no guarantees that CMOC will fully benefit from this price upturn, as the ban could be extended. Moreover, when exports resume, a potential influx of cobalt could pressure prices downward. In response, the DRC is considering export quotas to maintain market equilibrium, though specific details have not been disclosed.
This article was initially published in French by Emiliano Tossou (Ecofin Agency)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
The Kamoa-Kakula copper mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) produced 133,120 tonnes of copper concentrate in Q1 2025, from 86,117 tonnes in the same quarter in 2024, thus 58% up. On April 7, Canadian operator Ivanhoe Mines released the figures.
This growth was fueled by strong performance across the mine's three concentrators, which processed a record 3.72 million tonnes of ore in the quarter. The Phase 3 concentrator was particularly notable, milling 1.51 million tonnes of ore alone, while the mine achieved a daily record of 51,528 tonnes by the end of March.
The robust output aligns with Ivanhoe's 2025 production targets for Kamoa-Kakula, which project between 520,000 and 580,000 tonnes of copper concentrate for the year, up from the 437,061 tonnes delivered in 2024. Ivanhoe also expects ore grades at the Phase 3 concentrator to improve throughout the year, driving continued strong results.
Ownership of the Kamoa-Kakula mine is split among the Congolese state, which holds a 20% stake, Ivanhoe Mines and Zijin Mining, each holding 39.6%, and Crystal River Global Limited, with a 0.8% interest. The mine's operational achievements underline its growing role as a significant contributor to the DRC’s copper production and its strategic importance in the global copper market.
This article was initially published in French by Aurel Sèdjro Houenou (Ecofin Agency)
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Genew Technologies and Zhongshi Wosen, both Chinese companies, will help the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) build its fiber optic network. The Congolese Minister of Telecoms, Augustin Maliba, signed the related memorandum of understanding(MoU) on April 7, 2025.
"With the support of the Minister and the Agency for the Steering, Coordination and Monitoring of Collaboration Agreements (APCSC), we will strive to significantly improve the telecommunications sector in the DRC," said Wu Minhua, CEO of Genew Technologies. He also noted that the DRC had been on his company’s radar for investment for several years, adding, "The time has come, that's why we're here."
While MoUs often lead to collaboration, they are not legally binding commitments. Thus, only definitive agreements will seal the partnership with Genew Technologies and Zhongshi Wosen.
Genew Technologies, founded in 2005 and headquartered in Shenzhen, specializes in end-to-end communication solutions and telecommunications infrastructure. It is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Zhongshi Wosen, on the other hand, remains less known, though it is already active in the DRC. Its president, Zhou Tiesheng, visited Central South University (CSU) in China alongside a Congolese government delegation in November 2024.
According to the Congolese Ministry of Telecom, the two Chinese companies are experienced in ICT and fiber optic communications, and have worked in markets like Angola and Mauritania.
The need for infrastructure development in the DRC is pressing. According to the Autorité de Régulation de la Poste et des Télécommunications (ARPTC), only 9,361 km of optical fiber have been deployed out of the 50,000 km outlined in the Plan National du Numérique – Horizon 2025.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM) and Kisanfu Mining (KFM), two subsidiaries of Chinese group China Molybdenum Corporation Limited (CMOC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), reported impressive sales of 50.6 billion yuan renminbi ($7.05 billion) in 2024, up 80.71% compared to 2023. The figure was almost 40% of the DRC's national budget 2024.
Over the year reviewed, CMOC sold 689,521 tonnes of copper, generating $5.82 billion, and 108,892 tonnes of cobalt, contributing $1.22 billion. The DRC accounted for 77.5% of mineral output sold directly by the Chinese group; it was the group's most profitable jurisdiction in terms of gross margin (47.1%), despite rising operating costs.
“During the first half of 2024, three production lines at TFM's mixed ore project achieved their production targets and standards. This brought TFM's production lines to five, with an annual copper capacity of 450,000 tonnes. Combined with KFM's annual capacity of 150,000 tonnes, the group operated six production lines in the DRC, exceeding 600,000 tonnes per year,” CMOC officials explained.
This strong performance comes amid fluctuating market conditions. While copper prices held steady in 2024, cobalt prices fell 26.57% over the year, from over $28,000 per tonne in January to $24,000 in December.
Regulatory Challenges
Last February, Congolese authorities temporarily suspended cobalt exports for four months to stabilize prices on an oversupplied market.
However, CMOC has kept producing and stockpiling. In Q1 2025, the group produced 30,414 tonnes of cobalt, up 20.7% year-over-year, and maintained its annual forecast of 100,000 to 120,000 tonnes. Since the suspension, cobalt prices have rebounded, rising 57%, reinforcing CMOC's strategy.
The DRC remains a critical player in the global cobalt supply chain, with TFM and KFM accounting for over 70% of global cobalt production. In 2024, the two subsidiaries contributed to 60% of the DRC’s cobalt exports and 45% of copper exports, generating substantial state revenues from mining royalties and taxes.
Looking ahead, CMOC’s prospects in the DRC remain strong, but challenges persist. The group faces regulatory hurdles, geopolitical tensions between China and the U.S., evolving demand for battery metals, and calls for greater supply chain transparency. Its strategy of diversification, vertical integration, and investment in sustainable infrastructure will be crucial for maintaining its growth trajectory while addressing environmental and social concerns associated with mining in Central Africa.
It is worth noting that CMOC, via its Swiss subsidiary IXM, which specializes in raw materials trading, also markets resources purchased from other producers.
This article was initially published in French by Georges Auréole Bamba
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
On April 2, 2025, China Molybdenum Co. Ltd (CMOC) issued a tender call for electrical work in the localities of Kisanfu Gare and Koni, Lualaba province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The project involves constructing a 2.5 km 11 kV medium-voltage line, creating low-voltage networks, and installing a public lighting system.
Interested companies must submit applications by April 7, including legal and financial compliance documentation and references for similar projects.
This initiative is part of the development of the Kisanfu mining project, which CMOC acquired in December 2020 for $550 million from Freeport-McMoRan. The Kisanfu deposit is notable for its significant copper and cobalt resources, which are crucial for electric vehicle battery production.
CMOC is a major player in subcontracting in the DRC. In 2024, it awarded over $985 million in contracts to local companies through its Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu mines, accounting for nearly 50% of the total volume reported by the Autorité de régulation de la sous-traitance dans le secteur privé (ARSP).
Boaz Kabeya (intern)
Ivanhoe Mines is preparing for a significant increase in power requirements at the Kamoa-Kakula mine complex as it readies to commission the facility’s smelter in May 2025. By 2026, when all phases and the smelter are fully operational, electricity demand is expected to rise to approximately 240 MW, up from 130 to 140 MW in March 2025.
In a press release dated April 7, Ivanhoe has outlined its plans to meet this growing demand and transition the complex to green energy by 2026.
Last month, 100 MW came from hydroelectric sources. Half of the input came from Zambia or Mozambique, and the other half was produced on-site, by diesel generators. Following a recent agreement, hydroelectric imports have increased from 50 MW to 70 MW, with further expansion to 100 MW expected soon.
The commissioning of Inga II turbine 5 in the third quarter of 2025 will add another 50 MW of hydroelectric power, potentially bringing the total hydropower supply to 200 MW if imports are maintained at 100 MW. Additionally, Ivanhoe plans to launch a solar project in August 2025, which will provide a constant 30 MW of power through a 222 MWp photovoltaic solar power plant coupled with a battery storage system. The project falls under a recent agreement between Kamoa Copper, which owns the Kamoa-Kakula complex, and CrossBoundary Energy, a clean energy developer.
“This enhanced power capacity has bolstered confidence in finalizing the commissioning of the smelting furnace,” reads the April 7 release. According to this source, the smelter should produce its first 99.7% purity copper anodes by July 2025. Ivanhoe projects reaching around 80% of the smelter's capacity by year-end, with power consumption rising from 45 MW at start-up to 70 MW at full capacity.
By 2026, Ivanhoe aims to exceed annual copper production of 600,000 tonnes with the completion of Project 95, which seeks to optimize copper concentrate recovery to 95%. This initiative could add 30,000 to 40,000 tonnes of concentrate annually, following projected production of between 520,000 and 580,000 tonnes in 2025. After reaching 437,061 tonnes in 2024, Ivanhoe’s strategic investments in renewable energy and operational efficiency are set to drive significant growth in copper output.
This article was initially published in French by Pierre Mukoko
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
In Djugu territory, located in Ituri province, persistent insecurity and a lack of transportation have severely disrupted local agricultural activity. According to testimonies gathered by Radio Okapi, food crops such as potatoes, cabbages, and beans are rotting in the fields, unable to reach consumer centers like Bunia due to logistical challenges.
The situation is particularly dire in localities such as Largu and Drodro, where armed groups have made key roads impassable, including those connecting Largu, Saliboko, and Katoto. "The roads have become impassable. Harvested produce remains on the spot and ends up getting lost," lamented Charité Banza, a civil society representative in Northern Bahema.
A 2023 study by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) highlighted that 60% of farmers and 64% of herders in Ituri were already struggling to market their goods due to rising transport costs and deteriorating road infrastructure. These issues have limited market access, reduced rural incomes, and disrupted the flow of agricultural and livestock products to consumption centers.
Efforts have been made to address these challenges. In August 2024, the Stabilization and Recovery of Eastern DRC (Star-Est) project announced plans to rehabilitate 50 km of agricultural feeder roads in Djugu territory using high-intensity labor methods. This initiative aimed to open up production areas and facilitate crop evacuation along routes such as the Soleniama-Katoto-Kparngaza-Masumbuko-Blukwa axis. However, ongoing insecurity continues to undermine these efforts.
Beyond agricultural losses, the lack of transportation is affecting the supply of necessities in landlocked areas. Goods like soap, salt, and fuel typically transported from Bunia are becoming scarce, driving up prices. For instance, the price of a liter of fuel has surged from 3,500 to 5,000 Congolese francs in just a few weeks.
Boaz Kabeya (intern)
The Kipushi mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) produced 42,736 tonnes of zinc concentrate in the first quarter of 2025. Ivanhoe Mines, the asset’s Canadian owner, released the figure in its quarterly report dated April 7. The document indicates that Kipushi produced 18,946 and 32,490 tonnes in Q3 and Q4 of 2024, respectively.
Ivanhoe attributes the growth to strong operational momentum at the mine’s concentrator, which achieved an average recovery rate of 88%. During the past quarter, the facility milled a record 151,403 tonnes of ore with an average grade of 53% zinc in the concentrate produced.
Ivanhoe expects the mine to deliver between 180,000 and 240,000 tonnes of zinc concentrate this year, which is significantly higher than the 50,307 tonnes recorded in 2024. However, at the current pace, projected annual production would reach only 170,944 tonnes, falling short of the lower end of the target range. The second quarter will be critical in determining whether Ivanhoe can meet its annual goals.
Operational challenges in 2024 had already forced Ivanhoe to revise its forecasts downward from an initial estimate of 100,000–140,000 tonnes to just 50,000–70,000 tonnes. While Kipushi’s ramp-up is promising, sustained progress will be necessary to achieve its ambitious production targets for 2025.
The Kipushi mine came online last June.
This article was initially published in French by Aurel Sèdjro Houenou
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho
Kobold Metals, a mining company backed by Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates, is gaining traction in its bid to acquire a stake in the Manono lithium project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Recent developments, including the visit of Massad Boulos, U.S. President Donald Trump’s Senior Advisor for Africa, to Kinshasa on April 2-3, 2025, signal growing U.S. interest in the DRC’s mining sector.
During his meeting with President Félix Tshisekedi, Boulos discussed strengthening bilateral ties through a potential “security for minerals” agreement to boost U.S. private sector investment, foster peace in the African nation, and preserve its territorial integrity. While details of the agreement remain unclear, Boulos confirmed progress toward a framework that could support American companies like Kobold Metals.
"I look forward to working with President Félix Tshisekedi and his team to stimulate US private sector investment in the DRC, particularly in the mining sector, with the shared goal of contributing to the prosperity of our two countries," he added.
Kobold’s proposal to develop the Manono deposit, which it describes as “a large-scale, long-term lithium mine,” comes as the DRC faces legal disputes over the project. Resolving these issues could help Kinshasa close its case with AVZ Minerals, in which state-owned Cominière was condemned to pay €39.1 million in penalties.
Further boosting Kobold’s position are recent U.S. tariffs targeting various countries, including Indonesia and China, both major players in the lithium battery supply chain. Washington’s recent measures could bolster American investment in the DRC as global demand for lithium continues to rise.
China-US Rivalry
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is emerging as a strategic player in the global race for critical minerals, with its 11% tariff for access to the U.S. market positioning it as an attractive alternative for American companies like Kobold Metals. Under the Trump administration’s new trade policies, this low tariff rate, combined with exemptions on several critical minerals—including cobalt, graphite, lithium, and tantalum, according to La Tribune—reinforces the strategic importance of investing in the DRC. As one of the world’s leading producers of these resources, the DRC holds significant leverage in negotiations.
Further strengthening Kobold Metals’ position is a proposed bill in the U.S. Congress aimed at curbing China’s dominance in Africa’s critical mineral supply chains. With Beijing controlling 80% of mining projects in the DRC, this legislative initiative aligns with broader U.S. efforts to counter China’s influence while promoting American investment in Africa’s strategic resources.
The DRC, however, has its own priorities. It seeks not only a militarily reliable ally but also greater participation in value chains tied to its mineral wealth, particularly as it advances its energy transition goals. The recent launch of a special economic zone (SEZ) dedicated to producing battery precursors and potentially assembling electric vehicles underscores Kinshasa’s ambition to capture more value domestically.
Competing with Rio Tinto
Competition for Manono’s lithium is intensifying. Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto has reportedly expressed interest in the deposit, adding pressure on the Congolese government to resolve disputes and capitalize on Western interest. This rivalry between Kobold Metals and Rio Tinto could strengthen Kinshasa’s negotiating position but also accelerate decision-making in a sector where China remains dominant.
For the Trump administration to secure deeper access for American investors, it will need to offer tangible guarantees that address Kinshasa’s economic and security concerns. In this geopolitical contest over African minerals, Manono’s lithium has become emblematic of the global competition for resources critical to the energy transition. How this plays out will depend on whether the DRC can balance its strategic objectives with mounting international interest in its mineral wealth.
This article was initially published in French by Georges Auréole Bamba
Edited in English by Ola Schad Akinocho