Rebels from the AFC/M23 group, backed by the Rwandan army, have taken control of Uvira, a city serving as the capital of South Kivu province since the fall of Bukavu in February, according to several local and international media reports. The Congolese government in Kinshasa has not yet officially confirmed the reports. It has, however, acknowledged “the deterioration of the security situation in Uvira.”

On Dec. 11, President Felix Tshisekedi chaired a restricted Council of Ministers to further assess the worsening security situation in the east of the country. He announced the convening of an inter-institutional meeting and an expanded Supreme Defence Council to further assess the situation.

The AFC/M23 advance in South Kivu will also be the focus of a United Nations Security Council meeting on Dec. 12. Several member states warn of a growing risk of the wider Great Lakes region igniting.

Logistical Hub

In addition to being a city bordering Burundi, Uvira is also a key logistics hub. Located on the RN5 highway, it sits astride a key road and lake transport corridor along Lake Tanganyika toward Fizi, then Kalemie, before reaching the provinces of Lualaba and Haut-Katanga, the heart of the Congolese copper and cobalt industry.

The port of Kalemie is described as an “economic lung” for Tanganyika, connecting the DRC to the ports of Bujumbura (Burundi), Mpulungu (Zambia) and Kigoma (Tanzania), which handle part of the flow of goods toward the mining south.

In this context, the AFC/M23’s progress along the RN5, already reported toward Kamanyola and Luvungi, lends weight to a scenario long discussed by military analysts, namely a gradual push southward that would transform the Uvira-Fizi-Kalemie axis into a viable route for infiltration toward the mining regions of Katanga.

The south of the DRC accounts for a large share of the global mining economy. Nearly 70% of the world’s cobalt production comes from the provinces of Lualaba and Haut-Katanga, where large copper-cobalt mines operated by Chinese and Western groups, or joint ventures with Gecamines, are located. These minerals are not only vital for the Congolese budget; they sit at the heart of global battery supply chains and the energy transition.

Prior Experience

The experience of North Kivu shows how an armed group can exploit mining revenue. U.N. expert reports detail a sophisticated system for capturing Rubaya’s coltan, with illegal exports estimated at 120-150 tons per month, generating hundreds of thousands of dollars for the AFC/M23.

If replicated in the south, such a modus operandi, involving controlling roads, taxing flows and contaminating supply chains, would pose a direct threat to a mining basin that accounts for nearly 70% of global cobalt supply and houses the country’s largest copper mines.

At this stage, no major industrial site in Katanga is directly threatened by the AFC/M23. But the consolidation of an arc of instability, stretching from North Kivu to Ituri and then to South Kivu and Tanganyika, would bring the front line closer to export corridors, a development closely watched by investors, insurers and importing states.

Mining companies are not yet officially communicating about a direct link between the AFC/M23’s advance and their operations in the south. But in consuming capitals, including Washington, Brussels and Beijing, the question of continuity of flows from Lualaba and Haut-Katanga is now inseparable from the evolving map of the conflict in eastern DRC.